Comparative politics of strategic voting: a hierarchy of electoral systems

Thomas Gschwend ()

No 04-41, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Traditionally the literature about electoral systems argues that the size of the district magnitude determines the amount of strategic voting. I argue, however, that different electoral systems provide incentives that potentially undermine or facilitate the Duvergerian logic in practice. Contrary to the literature the results indicate that the impact of the district magnitude on the frequency of strategic voting in a given polity is conditional on the type of seat allocation system that defines how votes get translated into parliamentary seats.

Date: 2004
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