The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux versus bundling

Martin Hellwig

No 04-02, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation contraints, the final allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satisfies a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.

Keywords: Mechanism design; excludable public goods; Ramsey-Boitreux pricing; renegotiation proofness; bundling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 H21 H41 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2742/1/dp04_02.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2742

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504 Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Katharina Rautenberg ().