A utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods

Martin Hellwig

No 03-36, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: The paper studies utilitarian welfare maximization in a model with an excludable public good where individual preferences are private information. If inequality aversion is large, optimal allocations involve the use of admission fees and exclusion to redistribute resources from people who benefit a lot from the public good to people who benefit little. If inequality aversion is close to zero, optimal admission fees are zero. These results are robust if earning abilities provide an additional source of heterogeneity and income taxation an additional policy instrument.

Keywords: Public-good provision; entry fees for excludable public goods; utilitarian welfare maximization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2747/1/dp03_36.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: A utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods (2005)
Working Paper: A Utilitarian Approach to the Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2747

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504 Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Katharina Rautenberg ().