The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory

Benny Moldovanu () and Christian Ewerhart

No 02-05, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: We briefly survey several insights about value and revenue maximization in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure probelm that caused firms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.

Date: 2002
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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2797/1/dp02_05.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory (2002)
Working Paper: The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2797

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