Local and group interaction in prisoners' dilemma experiments

Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel

No 00-11, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: This study investigates experimentally the effects of locality on learning and strategic behaviour in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We compare a simple situation that models space (players interact only with their neighbours) with one that does not (players interact with all members of the population). Within this context different information conditions are studied. We find that imitation, while assumed to be a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, is a negligible factor in the experiment. Behaviour is driven by reinforcement learning and, under specific conditions, strategic behaviour.

Keywords: Local interaction; experiments; prisoners dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 D83 H41 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2832

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