Bidding against an unknown number of competitors sharing affiliated information

Jan Vleugels

No 97-13, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: In the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber, equilibrium bidding is analyzed with a stochastic number of bidders. the equilibrium strategies generalize the known expressions in a coherent way. For the equilibrium bid function of the first price auction, an interpretation involving 'marginal winning probabilities' is proposed. With ageneralized version of the linkage principle, the well-known revenue ranking theorems extend to a stochastic number of bidders. As an application, we show that the seller's generically optimal information policy regarding the number of competitors is concealing the information.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2898/1/dp97_13.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2898

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504 Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Katharina Rautenberg ().