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You play (an action) only once

Karl Schlag () and Aner Sela

No 97-10, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies consitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Date: 1997
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Journal Article: You play (an action) only once (1998) Downloads
Working Paper: You play (an auction) only once (1997) Downloads
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