The Influence of Elections on Compliance with World Bank Conditionality and IMF Program Interruptions

Axel Dreher

No 604, Discussion Papers from Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre

Abstract: Using panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs around election dates in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre-election years. Using a proxy for IMF program interruptions it is shown that breakdowns are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper concludes with implications for reform.

JEL-codes: D72 F33 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/1007/1/604.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:vpaper:1007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Katharina Rautenberg ().