Flip a coin or vote: an Experiment on choosing group decision

Timo Hoffmann and Sander Renes

No 16-11, Working Papers from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract: Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals’ mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual preferences for choice rules are sensitive to individual expected payoffs. Our results highlight the importance of considering participation constraints when designing choice institutions.

JEL-codes: C91 C92 D70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-ppm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:wpaper:41104

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