Assigning an unpleasant task without payment

Susanne Goldlücke and Thomas Tröger
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Troeger

No 18-02, Working Papers from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract: How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing the service, but some individuals are better suited for the task than others. The optimal mechanism is a threshold rule that assigns the task randomly among volunteers if enough volunteers come forward, and otherwise assigns the task among the non-volunteers.

Keywords: Volunteering; public good provision; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D71 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
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Working Paper: Assigning an unpleasant task without payment (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:wpaper:44076

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