Bribes, Bureaucracies and Blackouts: Towards Understanding How Corruption at the Firm Level Impacts Electricity Reliability (Payne Institute Policy Brief)

Harrison Fell () and Harrison Fell ()
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Harrison Fell: Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines
Harrison Fell: Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines

No 2015-10, Payne Institute Policy Briefs from Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business

Keywords: corruption; electricty; reliability; quality of government; institutions; common-pool resource (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O1 Q4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 1 pages
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://econbus-papers.mines.edu/working-papers/pol ... _brief_WP2015-10.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mns:pbrief:wp2015-10

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