EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The deterrence effect of linear versus convex penalties in environmental policy: laboratory evidence

Marcelo Caffera ()

No 1702, Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers from Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo.

Abstract: We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly convex) and two different regulatory instruments (emission standards and tradable pollution permits). We find that a convex penalty, as compared to a linear penalty, increases the market price of pollution permits and the violation rate of firms. The effect of the structure of the fine on the price of permits operates through an increase in the ask-prices of sellers, not on the bids by suppliers. With convex penalties, sellers are not willing to sell a permit at a price as low as with linear penalties. We do not observe an effect of convex penalties on the compliance status of firms with emission standards. These results call for attention on the possible effect that the type of penalties may have on the cost-effectiveness of pollution control programs based on tradable pollution permits.

Keywords: Environmental policy; enforcement; penalty structure; emissions standards; emissions trading; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 L51 Q58 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.um.edu.uy/docs/The_deterrence_effect_of ... oratory_evidence.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnt:wpaper:1702

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers from Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mathias Ribeiro ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-26
Handle: RePEc:mnt:wpaper:1702