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Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Joint Ventures

Alireza Naghavi and Dermot Leahy

Center for Economic Research (RECent) from University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi"

Abstract: We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North-South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.

Keywords: North-South Joint Ventures; Intellectual Property Rights; FDI Policy; Technology Transfer; R&D Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F23 L24 O24 O32 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 26
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
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