Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

Center for Economic Research (RECent) from University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi"

Abstract: In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result.

Keywords: atomless; single crossing; strict Nash; pure Nash; monotone Nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 7
Date: 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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