Instrumental Cardinal Concerns for Social Status in Two-Sided Matching with Non-Transferable Utility
Ennio Bilancini and
Leonardo Boncinelli ()
Center for Economic Research (RECent) from University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi"
In this paper we apply the instrumental approach to social preferences in order to distinguish among various shapes of preferences for social status. In particular, we consider the shape of reduced preferences that emerge in the equilibrium of a two-sided matching model with non-transferable utility. Cole et al. (1992, 1995) show that, under full observability of potential mates’ attributes, instrumental concerns for social status are ordinal, i.e., only one’s own rank in the distribution of attributes matters. We show that when we depart from full observability, instrumental concerns for social status become cardinal, i.e., also other features of the distribution of attributes matter. We also show that the actual shape of cardinal concerns depends on how individuals can deal with the informational asymmetry, alternatively leading to upward concerns – i.e., making comparisons with higher rank people – downward concerns – i.e., making comparisons with lower rank people – or bidirectional concerns – i.e, being both upward and downward.
Keywords: asymmetric information; matching; social preferences; instrumental approach; social status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 C78 D10 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mod:recent:095
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Center for Economic Research (RECent) from University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().