COMPULSORY OR VOLUNTARY PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION? THEORY AND SOME EVIDENCE

Chongwoo Choe and Chander Shekhar

No 20/08, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a voluntary pre-merger notification game under asymmetric information and characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria. It is shown that the equilibrium outcomes are similar to those when notification is compulsory. However, thanks to the signaling opportunity that arises when notification is voluntary, voluntary notification leads to lower enforcement costs for the regulator and lower notification costs for the merging parties. Some of the theoretical predictions are supported by exploratory empirical tests using merger data from Australia where pre-merger notification is voluntary. Overall, our results suggest that voluntary merger notification may achieve objectives similar to those achieved by compulsory systems at lower costs to the parties as well as to the regulator.

Keywords: Merger regulation; pre-merger notification; abnormal returns. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 G34 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2008-07-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Compulsory or voluntary pre-merger notification? Theory and some evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-merger Notification? Theory and Some Evidence (2009)
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