Blame-Games, the Media and Discretionary Behaviour of Bureaucrats

Paul Raschky

No 07-10, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the negative effect of media reports on the provision of public goods by bureaucratic agencies. I provide a simple career concerns model where negative publicity in the media can affect the bureaucrat's future wage. The proposition of the model is tested using data of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' spending on flood protection from 1968-2008.

Keywords: Theory of Bureaucracy; Blame-Shifting; Natural Hazards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
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