Golden-rule social security and public health in a dynastic model with endogenous longevity and fertility
Jie Zhanga and
Siew Ling Yew ()
No 07-11, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics
In this paper we investigate long-run optimal social security and public health and their effects on fertility, longevity, capital intensity, output per worker and welfare in a dynastic model with altruistic bequests. Under empirically plausible conditions, social security and public health reduce fertility and raise longevity, capital intensity and output per worker. The effects of social security, except that on longevity, are stronger than those of public health. Numerically, they can improve welfare (better when they are used together than used separately). We also illustrate numerically that there exists a unique convergent solution in the dynamic system at the steady state.
Keywords: Social security; Public health; Life expectancy; Fertility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 J13 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dge and nep-hea
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