Reward Self-Reporting to Deter Corruption: An Experiment on Mitigating Collusive Bribery

Kevin Wu and Klaus Abbink

No 42-13, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness of offering rewards for self reports as a means of combating collusive bribery. Rewarding self reporting theoretically sows distrust between parties tempted to exchange bribes and may reduce bribery even where authorities are otherwise ineffective in uncovering corruption. Our results indicate that offering rewards is weakly effective in reducing collusive bribery where parties expect to engage with one another in future and is a potent deterrent when parties do not expect to encounter one another again. Rewarding self reporting is thus likely to be highly effective in reducing bribery in the field but only for one off interactions.

Keywords: Collusive bribery; experiment; asymmetric reporting; Reward; Bonus Leniency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery (2017)
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