The Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model

Chrysostomos Mantzavinos ()
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Chrysostomos Mantzavinos: Faculty of Economics and Business, Witten/Herdecke University

No 2004_1a, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals.

Keywords: Antitrust; Competition; Competition Policy; Evolutionary Process; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_01a

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