A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types

Tilman Börgers () and Peter Norman ()

No 2005_14, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.

Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2005-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types (2009)
Working Paper: A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types (2005)
Working Paper: A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types (2005)
Working Paper: A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types (2005)
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