Making International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational-Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Ius Standi Provisions

Anne van Aaken ()

No 2005_16, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Empirical research shows that international human rights law is to a large extent ineffective. Individual complaint mechanisms are the only significantly effective enforcement mechanism. Certainly many variables influence the success of enforcement through judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms but one important variable are provisions of ius standi as they have a gate-keeping function. International human rights law can be rendered more effective if individual victims have both de jure and de facto access to its remedies. This article analyzes the different incentives provided by complaint mechanisms for individuals, groups or NGOs to make use of international human rights bodies. They are such, that an insufficient enforcement of IHRL can be expected.

Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2005-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2005_16online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_16

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().