Inequity Aversion, Reciprocity, and Appropriateness in the Ultimatum-Revenge Game

Andreas Nicklisch ()
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Andreas Nicklisch: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2008_24, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh reactions.

Keywords: distributional preferences; fairness; intentional based preferences; social welfare; ultimatum bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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