Winners and Losers of Early Elections: On the Welfare Implications of Political Blockades and Early Elections

Felix Bierbrauer (bierbrauer@coll.mpg.de) and Lydia Mechtenberg
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Felix Bierbrauer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 2008_50, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome a blockade. They have the advantage that urgent decisions are no longer delayed, and the disadvantage that unsuccessful governments gain additional time in office. This may give rise to a time inconsistency. Voters are in favour of a constitution without early elections. However, in the middle of a political crisis, they are willing to abandon it.

Keywords: early elections; political blockades; ideological rigidities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Winners and losers of early elections: On the welfare implications of political blockades and early elections (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_50

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