Mechanism Design and Intentions
Felix Bierbrauer () and
Nick Netzer ()
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Felix Bierbrauer: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
No 2016_04, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social choice functions are implementable. We show how these results extend to a two-dimensional mechanism design setting where the agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic account of the welfare implications of intentionality.
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Psychological Games; Social Preferences; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D02 D03 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Mechanism design and intentions (2016)
Working Paper: Mechanism design and intentions (2014)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Intentions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_04
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