Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study
Mark Le Quement and
Isabel Marcin ()
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Isabel Marcin: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
No 2016_05, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees of strategic communication. We use a 2 x 2 design varying the information protocol (communication vs exogenous public signals) and the group composition (heterogeneous vs homogeneous). Results are only consistent with the third model. Roughly 80% of (heuristic) subjects truth-tell and vote with the majority of announced signals. Remaining (sophisticated) agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule.
Keywords: Committees; Voting; Information Aggregation; Cheap Talk; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03, Revised 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pr~, nep-net and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_05
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