Bank Leverage, Welfare, and Regulation

Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig

No 2018_13, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisis-prone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks’ distress and default cause, such claims are invalid because banks have multiple small creditors and are unable to commit effectively to their overall funding mix and investment strategy ex ante. The resulting market outcomes under laissez-faire are inefficient and involve excessive borrowing, with default risks that jeopardize the purported liquidity benefits. Contrary to claims in the literature that “equity is expensive” and that regulation requiring more equity in the funding mix entails costs to society, such regulation actually helps create useful commitment for banks to avoid the inefficiently high borrowing that comes under laissez-faire. Effective regulation is beneficial even without considering systemic risk; if such regulation also reduces systemic risk, the benefits are even larger.

Keywords: Liquidity in banking; leverage in banking; banking regulation; capital structure; capital regulations; agency costs; commitment; contracting; maturity rat race; leverage ratchet effect; Basel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D53 D61 G01 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G38 H81 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cfn, nep-law and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bank Leverage, Welfare, and Regulation (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_13

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