Incomplete-Information Games in Large Populations with Anonymity

Martin Hellwig

No 2019_14, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The paper provides mathematical foundations for modeling strategic interdependence with a continuum of agents where uncertainty has an aggregate component and an agent-speci?c component and the latter satis?es a conditional law of large numbers. This decomposition of uncertainty is implied by a condition of anonymity in beliefs, under which the agent in question considers the other agents? types to be essentially pairwise exchangeable. If there is also anonymity in payoff functions, all strategically relevant aspects of beliefs are contained in an agent?s macro beliefs about the cross-section distribution of the other agents?types. The paper also gives conditions under which a function assigning macro beliefs to types is compatible with the existence of a common prior. Key Words: Incomplete-information games, large populations, belief functions, common priors, exchangeability, conditional independence, conditional exact law of large numbers.

Keywords: Monetary union; central banking; politics of banks; banking union; bank resolution; bail-in. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity (2022)
Working Paper: Incomplete-Information Games in Large Populations with Anonymity (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2019_14

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