Motivated Reasoning, Information Avoidance, and Default Bias

Katharina Momsen () and Sebastian Schneider
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Katharina Momsen: University of Innsbruck

No 2022_03, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We investigate whether the presence of a default interacts with the willingness of decision-makers to gather, process and consider information. In an online experiment, where about 2,300 participants choose between two compiled charity donation options worth $100, we vary the availability of information and the presence of a default. Information avoidance, when possible, increases default effects considerably, manifesting a hitherto undocumented channel of the default bias. Moreover, we show that defaults trigger motivated reasoning: In the presence of a default – even if self-selected–, participants consider new information to a lower degree than without a preselected option.

Keywords: Motivated reasoning; information avoidance; defaults; status quo; charitable giving; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D64 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Motivated Reasoning, Information Avoidance, and Default Bias (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2022_03

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