The suing paradox: Inferring applicants‘ motives from the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of assembly

Christoph Engel ()
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Christoph Engel: Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Bonn

No 2026_01, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics from Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics

Abstract: Instrumental motives can only explain a minority of the applications for a violation of freedom of assembly that the European Court of Human Rights has published, even if one includes indirect benefits, like mounting international pressure, or fuelling local mobilisa-tion. For most cases, the cost-benefit balance is clearly negative. One needs non-instrumental, expressive motives to resolve the “suing paradox†. Analysing all 691 pub-lished decisions with the help of the large language model gemini 2.5 flash, one finds trac-es of a substantial list of deontological concerns, and markers for emotional involvement. Applications by human subjects are a necessary condition for human rights institutions to increase the standard of protection in their member states. International law scholars in-terested in understanding this input by protected individuals should direct their attention to expressive motives and emotional involvement.

Date: 2026-01
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