Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy

Anne-Kathrin Bronsert, Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: A woman assessing the wealth of a potential husband may observe some, but not all, of his wealth. She may screen, leading to status consumption and wasteful gift giving. The screening activity is costly both for the potential husband, and for the woman, as it reduces the wealth of the man she may marry. A sound observable financial background (old money) benefits the candidate but also the woman, and reduces wasteful status consumption spending. Also, ageing and attractiveness of the woman affect the equilibrium conspicuous spending pattern.

Keywords: marriage; screening; search; conspicuous consumption; status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-08
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