Public Debt and the Threat of Secession

Rhea Molato

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper examines public debt as a strategic instrument in preventing secession. Using a game theoretic model, it shows that debt can be used to preempt a country's separation if the seceding region's potential gain from independence is strictly decreasing in debt. This paper identifies sufficient conditions under which this property holds. First, the indirect effect of debt on the seceding region's potential gain from independence must be negative. Second, the indirect e¤ect of debt must be stronger than its direct effect. When the seceding region's potential gain from independence is decreasing in debt, then it can be prevented from leaving the union by setting higher levels of debt until it reaches a certain threshold level. This paper also finds that the ma jority region may use debt as a strategic instrument to preserve the union if it is better off in a country with debt than as a separate state with savings.

Keywords: secession; debt; sovereign debt; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H30 H63 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2015-06
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