Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants

Nava Kahana and Doron Klunover

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: The literature on aggregative games, which has been applied in the study of contests, has focused on simultaneous games. We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players. It is shown that: (1) there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, and (2) unlike in the case of a small contest, aggregate expenditure in a large contest is lower than in the corresponding simultaneous contest.

Keywords: Aggregative games; Sequential Contests; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2017-02

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