Sequential Majoritarian Blotto Games

Tilman Klumpp and Kai Konrad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player’s overall budget. As a consequence, a player’s chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battleï¬ eld and of the number of victories and losses the player accumulated in prior battles. This result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either ï¬ xed budgets or a majoritarian objective. We also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget. For many contest success functions, if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended games resembles an all-pay auction without noise.

Keywords: Blotto games; dynamic battles; multi-battle contest; all-pay auctions; sequential elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Sequential Majoritarian Blotto Games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2018-05

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