Attacking and Defending Multiple Valuable Secrets in a Big Data World

Kai Konrad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper studies the attack-and-defence game between a web user and a whole set of players over this user’s ‘valuable secrets.’ The number and type of these valuable secrets are the user’s private information. Attempts to tap information as well as privacy protection are costly. The multiplicity of secrets is of strategic value for the holders of these secrets. Users with few secrets keep their secrets private with some probability, even though they do not protect them. Users with many secrets protect their secrets at a cost that is smaller than the value of the secrets protected. The analysis also accounts for multiple redundant information channels with cost asymmetries, relating the analysis to attack-and-defence games with a weakest link.

Keywords: OR in societal problem analysis; big-data; privacy; web user; conflict; information rents; valuable secrets; attack-and-defence; multiple attackers; multiple defence items; multi-front contest. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mic
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http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2019-05.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Attacking and defending multiple valuable secrets in a big data world (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2019-05

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