Conflict Prevention by Bayesian Persuasion

Raphaela Hennigs

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: Drawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex-ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information about each conflicting party’s strength and commits to sharing the obtained information with the respective opponent. The conflicting parties can be convinced not to ï¬ ght each other. The conflicting parties beneï¬ t from mediation, as the ex-ante war probability is reduced. The beneï¬ t is taken up by weak conflicting parties. This beneï¬ t is larger when war is costlier and when the war probability absent mediation is higher.

Keywords: mediation; conflict; information design; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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