Campaign Contests in Mixed Electoral Systems

Yixuan Shi

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: In mixed electoral systems, candidates can win parliamentary seats either by securing the most votes in local districts or through party lists. Candidates’ successes of district elections often hinge on personal charisma, whereas the total number of party seats depends on the overall party vote share. With limited campaign budget, candidates face a trade-off between allocating resources towards their individual or team battles: more individualised campaigning boosts individual appeal and attract voters at local districts, while more party-centric campaigning increases the party’s seat share. We examine how candidates allocate resources in mixed electoral systems using a contest-theoretical model. Under a closed-list system, where party-level prizes are distributed according to a predetermined ranking, lower-ranked candidates concentrate their efforts on their individual battles, while higher-ranked candidates balance resources in both battles. Their exact allocation also depends on the rank of their district-level opponents. In contrast, in an open-list system, where party-level prizes are tied to candidates' vote shares, all candidates are incentivised to contribute to party-centric campaigning.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52
Date: 2025-12-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur, nep-mic and nep-pol
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