The strategic effect of weak team members in dynamic conflicts between teams

Kai A. Konrad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: Why do strong players allow weak players to join their team, even though weak players are notorious for free riding? This paper shows that the dynamic structure of a tug-of-war is suitable for mobilizing efforts by weak players and making the team to become stronger and to succeed. The strategic role of weak players emerges if the dynamics for the team develop unfavorably for the team. If the team falls behind, a discouragement effect sets in for the strong player. The player is inclined to throw the towel. This alarms the weak player. The player hoped to be able to free-ride and gain an expected windfall payoff. This payoff is lost if the strong player gives up. At that point the weak player actively seeks to motivate the strong player to perform at its best.

Keywords: tug-of-war; dynamic contest; teams; team contests; free-riding; discouragement effect; asymmetric teams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2026-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2026-07

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