Demonstrated Interest: Signaling Behavior in College Admissions

James A. Dearden, Suhui Li, Chad Meyerhoefer and Muzhe Yang

Mathematica Policy Research Reports from Mathematica Policy Research

Abstract: In college admission decisions, important and possibly competing goals include increasing the quality of the freshman class and making the school more selective while attaining the targeted size of the incoming class.

Keywords: college; admission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: DEMONSTRATED INTEREST: SIGNALING BEHAVIOR IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS (2017)
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