Couples' and Singles’ Savings After Retirement

Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French and John Jones

Working Papers from University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center

Abstract: We model the saving problem of retired couples and singles facing uncertain longevity and medical expenses in presence of means-tested social insurance. Households can save to self-insure against uncertain longevity and medical expenses, and to leave bequests. Individuals in a couple can be altruistic towards their spouse and other heirs and split bequests optimally. Single people can care about leaving bequests to children and others. Using AHEAD data, we first estimate the model and we then evaluate the relative importance of the various savings motives and the risk exposure of couples’ versus singles.

Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-ias
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