Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice:Existence Results on Resoluteness

Onur Doğan () and Ayça Giritligil ()

No 201501, Working Papers from Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University

Abstract: We present the existence conditions of anonymous, neutral and resolute social welfare and social choice rules in a group theoretical framework. We define the maximum domain at which such aggregation rules exist. We propose a tie-breaking procedure to obtain resolute refinements of social choice rules, which preserves anonymity and neutrality. The conditions for this refinement to satisfy simple monotonicity are compared with such conditions for the resolute refinements obtained via conventional tie-breaking mechanisms.

Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2015-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repeck.bilgi.org.tr/RePEc/msc/wpaper/mscent ... _on_Resoluteness.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:msc:wpaper:201501

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cankut Kuzlukoglu ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).