Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides

Bernard De Meyer, Ehud Lehrer () and Dinah Rosenberg
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Ehud Lehrer: School of Mathematical Sciences - Tel Aviv University, http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~lehrer/

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In a Bayesian game some players might receive a noisy signal regarding the specific game actually being played before it starts. We study zero-sum games where each player receives a partial information about his own type and no information about that of the other player and analyze the impact the signals have on the payoffs. It turns out that the functions that evaluate the value of information share two property. The first is Blackwell monotonicity, which means that each player gains from knowing more. The second is concavity on the space of conditional probabilities

Keywords: Value of information; Blackwell monotonicity; concavity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D80 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09035.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides (2010)
Working Paper: Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09035

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