The Structure of Unstable Power Systems

Joseph Abdou

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: A power system is modeled by an interaction form, the solution of which is called a settlement. By stability we mean the existence of some settlement for any preference profile. Like in other models of power structure, instability is equivalent to the existence of a cycle. Structural properties of the system like maximality, regularity, superadditivity and exactness are defined and used to determine the type of instability that may affect the system. A stability index is introduced. Loosely speaking this index measures the difficulty of the emergence of configurations that produce a deadlock. As applications we have a characterization of solvable game forms, an analysis of the structure of their instability and a localization of their stability index in case where solvability fails

Keywords: Interaction form; effectivity function; stability index; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium; solvability; acyclicity; Nakamura number; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09042.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009)
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009)
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009)
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09042

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