Existence of pure Nash equilibria in discontinuous and non quasiconcave games

Philippe Bich ()
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Philippe Bich: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In a recent but well known paper, Reny has proved the existence of Nash equilibria for compact and quasiconcave games, with possibly discontinuous payoff functions. In this paper, we prove that the quasiconcavity assumption in Reny's theorem can be weakened: we introduce a measure allowing to localize the lack of quasiconcavity, which allows to refine the analysis of equilibrium existence

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; discontinuity; quasiconcavity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09061

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