Subjective beliefs formation and elicitation rules: experimental evidence

Guillaume Hollard, Sébastien Massoni and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Since they have been increasingly used in economics, elicitation rules for subjective beliefs are under scrutiny. In this paper, we propose an experimental design to compare the performance of such rules. Contrary to previous works in which elicited beliefs are compared to an objective benchmark, we consider a pure subjective belief framework (confidence in own performance in a cognitive task and a perceptual task). The performances of elicitation rules are assessed according to the accuracy of stated beliefs in predicting success. For the perceptual task we also compare stated beliefs to Signal Detection Theory predictions. We find consistent evidence in favor of the Lottery Rule which provides more accurate beliefs and is not sensitive to risk aversion. Furthermore the Free Rule, a simple rule with no incentives, elicits relevant beliefs and even outperforms the Quadratic Scoring Rule. Beside this comparison, we propose a belief formation model where we distinguish between two stages in the beliefs: beliefs for decision making and confidence beliefs. Our results give support to this model

Keywords: Belief elicitation; confidence; signal Detection Theory; methodology; incentives; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C91 D81 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Subjective beliefs formation and elicitation rules: experimental evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Subjective beliefs formation and elicitation rules: experimental evidence (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10088

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