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New products and corruption: evidence from Indian firms

Felipe Starosta de Waldemar

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: It has been shown that corruption has a negative effect on firm productivity, but what about its impact on product innovation? We find that corruption, functioning as a bribe tax, diminishes the probability of new product introduction. We use a World Bank Enterprise Survey from India in 2005, with 1600 firms answering if they introduced a new product to the firm and on the average quantity of bribe paid by firms. Controlling for innovation determinants, firm characteristics, location choice, multi-product firms and other business environment variables, sector-location bribe averages have a negative and significant impact on product innovation

Keywords: innovation; corruption; firm performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 L25 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11033.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: New Products and Corruption: Evidence from I ndian Firms (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: New Products and Corruption: Evidence from Indian Firms (2012)
Working Paper: New products and corruption: evidence from Indian firms (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11033

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