In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization

Gaël Giraud and Cécile Renouard
Additional contact information
Cécile Renouard: ESSEC - Business School

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper argues that mainstream economic theory, far from providing an indisputable plea in favor of shareholder value-maximization, offers striking arguments showing quite the opposite: profit-maximization cannot be a legitimate goal for private firms. This opens the door for a widening of a company's goal. We argue that it should include the concern of all the stakeholders of a company, and cannot be adequately addressed uniquely by Pigouvian taxes or by property rights. Coming to terms with this broad understanding of a company's goal should imply the internalization of the stakeholders' concern within the legal structure of the firm as in the case of the SCIC in France or the CIC in the UK

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; shareholder value; stakeholder value; incomplete markets; limited liability; property rights; collateral; cooperative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D21 D63 K11 L21 L33 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2011-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00611712 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization (2011)
Working Paper: In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization (2011)
Working Paper: In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization (2011)
Working Paper: In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11038

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().