Comportements stratégiques fiscaux des petits pays en Europe

Nicolas Chatelais

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper contribtes to the small empirical literature dealing with strategic tax behaviors of small EU countries. We estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing with each other. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg framework, we use panel data and tools from spatial econometrics to test the role of small countries in the tax competition within the enlarged European Union. We find that interactions are stronger among small countries of the EU than between large ones and tax rates set by small countries have influence on those set in large countries. Finally, small countries close to the center of the EU have more influence on the choice of tax policies in other countries than the small peripheral countries

Keywords: European Union; non-cooperative behaviors; tax competition; small countries; spatial econometrics; tax reaction function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 F21 F22 F23 H30 H32 H73 H77 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11080.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Comportements stratégiques fiscaux des petits pays en Europe (2011)
Working Paper: Comportements stratégiques fiscaux des petits pays en Europe (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11080

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