The bounded core for games with precedence constraints

Michel Grabisch and Peter Sudhölter
Additional contact information
Peter Sudhölter: University of Southern Denmark
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Sudhölter

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on games with coinciding precedence constraints. If the precedence constraints generate a connected hierarchy, then the core is always nonempty. It is shown that the bounded core is axiomatized similarly to the core for classical cooperative games, namely by boundedness (BOUND), nonemptiness for zero-inessential two-person games (ZIG), anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), and certain variants of the reduced game property (RGP), the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and the reconfirmation property. The core is the maximum solution that satisfies a suitably weakened version of BOUND together with the remaining axioms. For games with connected hierarchies, the bounded core is axiomatized by BOUND, ZIG, COV, and some variants of RGP and CRGP, whereas the core is the maximum solution that satisfies the weakened version of BOUND, COV, and the variants of RGP and CRGP

Keywords: TU game; core; restricted cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The bounded core for games with precedence constraints (2012)
Working Paper: The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints (2012)
Working Paper: The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints (2012)
Working Paper: The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints (2012)
Working Paper: The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints (2012)
Working Paper: The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints (2012)
Working Paper: The bounded core for games with precedence constraints (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label (lucie.label@univ-paris1.fr).