A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Strategic Games

Philippe Bich () and Rida Laraki ()
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Philippe Bich: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr
Rida Laraki: Ecole Polytechnique - Economics Department et IMJ - Equipe Combinatoire et Optimisation

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny's better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games] to Simon-Zame's endogenous tie-breaking rules [Simon, L.K. and Zame, W.R. (1990). Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules]

Keywords: Discontinuous games; Nash equilibrium; Reny equilibrium; better-reply security; endogenous sharing rule; quasi equilibrium; finite deviation equilibrium; symmetric games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12040

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